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KENTucKy LAW JouRNAL
STATE RESIDENCY REQUIREMENTS AND THE RIGHT
TO VOTE IN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS
I. INTRODUCrIoN-THE PROBLEM
It is difficult to say what place is taken up in the life of an in-
habitant of the United States by his concern for politics. To take
a hand in the regulation of society and to discuss it is his biggest
concern and, so to speak, the only pleasure an American knows.
. . . In some countries the inhabitants seem unwilling to avail
themselves of the political privileges which the law gives them;
* . . But if an American were condemned to confine his activities
to his own affairs, he would be robbed of one-half of his exist-
ence ...1 Alexis de Tocqueville.
Although de Tocqueville made that observation about Americans
more than a hundred years ago, its applicability is still true today.
While for most Americans voting is the sole act of participation in
politics,2 every four years millions of American citizens are denied
the right to participate in the election of the President and Vice Presi-
dent of the United States because they have failed to meet state
residency requirements.
The right to vote, and have it counted free of discrimination, has
been a subject which has frequently occupied an area of prime im-
portance for the Congress and the courts. However, despite the
great volume of court decisions, new legislation, and constitutional
amendments which have served to greatly expand the right of suf-
frage, the goal of full accessibility to the voting process has not yet
been attained.3
1 A. DE TocQuEviLE, DEMOCRACY rN Am c_.A 250 (P. Bradley ed. 1960).
2 A. CAMBELL, P. CoNVERSE, W. Mna.zn, D. SToxEs, THE A mucAN Vonm:
AN ABRMGEMENT 50 (1964). [Hereinafter cited as THE AMsmuNc VomER].
3 Some of the more important factors which have tended to dramatically
increase the number of eligible voters in the United States relate directly to the
abolishment of restrictions on the right to vote. The fourteenth and fifteenth
amendments provided assurance that the right to vote would not be denied be-
cause of race or color. Case decisions also served to outlaw other devices designed
toprevent Negroes from voting. See Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927),
and Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944), which held white primaries to be
unconstitutional. The "grandfather clause" was struck down in Guinn v. United
States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915). In Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Education, 383
U.S. 663 (1966), the Supreme Court held the poll tax to be unconstitutional.
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 guaranteed further enforcement for voting rights.
42 USC § 1971 (1964).
While most of the legislation was designed to guarantee the Negro the right
to vote, other significant constitutional amendments have also had a significant
impact in guaranteeing the right to vote. The nineteenth amendment provided
for women's suffrage which served to greatly increase the percentage of eligible
voters. Suffrage rights for citizens of the District of Columbia were guaranteed
tuonUnued on next page)
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Every state in the Union has some form of residency requirement.
They vary greatly in the length of residence required, ranging from
a high of two years in Mississippi4 to a low of 90 days in Pennsyl-
vania and New York,5 with some providing for no minimum require-
ment for voting in Presidential elections. 6 Most states also provide for
a minimum period of residence in the county and precinct so that
the right to vote for President and Vice President may be lost by
moving from one state to another, moving from one country to an-
other within the same state, or by merely moving from one precinct
to another within the same county.
7
Such requirements would probably cause little concern except for
the great internal mobility of the citizens of the United States. This
country has become a highly mobile nation, and the movement of
the population, whether for personal or business reasons, has be-
come much more common. In fact, the Census Bureau estimates that
about one-sixth of our people move their residence from one state to
another every decade.
8
Such freedom of movement among the population is no doubt
beneficial to both the individual and the country; ironically however,
such movement is penalized by state residency requirements which
often result in the disenfranchisement of millions of voters. Such
laws frequently penalize those who would be most likely to vote if
they could." One writer has observed that the movers generally,
"As a single gross category . . . are men who tend to be somewhat
better educated and who have considerably better jobs and higher
incomes than the natives of the region they leave."10
While the exact effect, in terms of the numbers of persons disen-
franchised by residency requirements, is not known, some estimates
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
by the twenty-third amendment to the Constitution. Finally the twenty-fourth
amendment eliminated the poll tax as a qualification for voting.
The abandonment of literacy tests has also been another significant gain
towards expanding suffrage in America. The effect which the attempts at ex-
pansion of the right to vote have had in greatly increasing the number of eligible
voters can he seen by an analysis of Section I in the Appendix.4 Miss CoDE ch. 2 § 3235 (1942).
5 N.Y. CONsT. art. II, § 1.; PENN. CoNsT. art. VII, § 1.0 See Section II, Appendix.
7 See Section II, Appendix. This note will attempt to deal only with require-
ments relating to residency within the State. The author recognizes however, that
county and precinct residence may also place a serious burden on the right to
vote but such discussion, except as it applies in general to the required state
residency, is beyond the scope of this note.
8 See 115 CONG. REc. 551-78 (daily ed. May 14, 1969).
9 See N. PrmcE, THE PEOPLES PF.mmrN= (1968); R. LANE, PorrrcAL LIFE
(1959); THE AMEmcAN VoTm, supra note 2.
3
0 Tm AM1EmucAN VOTER, supra note 2, at 233.
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have been made. For instance, it is estimated that five million citizens
were disenfranchised by residency requirements in 1954,11 between
five and eight million were estimated to have lost the right to vote in
1960,12 and the estimate for 1964 was almost fifteen million.13 Tenta-
tive estimates show almost two million voters lost the privilege of
voting by moving prior to the election date in 1968.14 These figures,
while admittedly not exact, do serve to point out the tremendous effect
that state residency requirements may have on a large segment of
the population.
It is the purpose of this note to analyze the present status of state
residency requirements, their effect on the right to vote in Presi-
dential elections, the constitutionality of such restrictions, and the
prospects and proposals for legislative changes at the federal and
state levels.
II. IIsTORy AND PURPOSE OF REFSIDENCY REQUIHEMENTS
The requirement that a person be a resident of the area in which
he votes is not new. In England the question of residency was
treated by statute as early as 1413. This statute provided that,
• * the knights and esquires and others which shall be choosers
of these rights of the shires, be also resident within the same
shires in manner and form as aforesaid; that is, 'at the day of the
date of the writ of the summons of the parliament." 5
Residency requirements for voting were also common in the Amer-
ican colonies. The warrants or the royal commissions by virtue of
which the earliest elections were held, were full of expressions such
as the "freeholders of the province," the "freeholders of thy bailiwick,"
"inhabitant," or "freemen inhabiting" a certain place.10
11 Goldman, Move-Lose Your Vote, 45 NAT'L MuN. REv. 6 (1956). See also
A. CAMPBELL, G. GEVISN and V. Mnjuan, THE Voi=i DECIeES 57 (1954), a
study of the 1952 election which showed that twelve percent of the people who
reported that they had not voted said they were disenfranchised because of
inability to meet residence requirements.1 2 REPORT OF TlE PRESIDENT'S ColnSSION ON REGISTRATION AND VOTING
PARTICIPATION 13 (1963); Andrews, AzMv cAN VOTING PARTICIPATING, (1966)
W. POL. Sci Q. 39 (1966); Schnidhauser, Residency Requirements for Voting
and the Tensions o na Mobile Society, 61 MicH. L. REv. 823 (1963); Seamonn,
The Electoral Process, 27 LAw & CoNTEln. PROB. 299, 304 (1962).
l3 Hearings on S. 596, S. 1546, S. 1880, and S. 1881 Before the Subcomm. on
Privileges and Elections of the Senate Comm. on Rules and Administration, 90th
Cong,, 1st Sess., at 21 (1967).
115 CONG. REc. 5744 (daily ed. May 27, 1969).
15 C. BIsHoP, HISToRY OF E.xcnoNS IN TE AmECAN COLONmS 69 (1893).
16 Id. at 66.
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In South Carolina, as early as 1698, officials recognized the neces-
sity for a period of residence as a requirement for voting when they
dissented from an act giving the privilege of electing representatives
to any person worth 10 pounds. One of the reasons given for their
action was because the act,
... not mentioning how long any person worth ten pounds must
have been an inhabitant of the county before he be admitted to
vote for members of the Assembly, it is so loose that by this Act
all the Pyrates that were in the Shipp that had been plundering
in the Red Sea had been qualified to vote for Representatives in
Carolina, which being of dangerous consequence to the inhabitants
we have thought fit to dissent to that act alone.
17
The development of residency requirements in the Eastern states
was aimed primarily at preventing immigrants from voting. One
writer has stated,
A certain characterism, plus fears of the political consequences of
bloc voting by the ignorant and pliable, led the Eastern states to
impose restrictions aimed at newly arrived immigrants. Immigrants
were a major source of labor for new industries in these states
and, therefore, were likely to congregate in the cities. Inevitably,
this created apprehensions about the emergence of a voting prole-
tariat. This combination of attitudes in the Eastern states tended
to contribute to their longer retention of property qualifications
and to stricter literacy and residence requirements for everyone.' 8
The fears of the Eastern States were probably well justified because
the political parties often attempted to use the immigrant votes to
influence elections. One writer observed,
Incompetent to give an intelligent vote, but soon finding that their
vote has a value, they fall into the hands of the party organiza-
tions, whose officers enroll them in their lists, and undertake to
fetch them to the polls. I was taken to watch the process of citizen
making in New York. Droves of squalid men, who looked as if they
had just emerged from an immigrant ship, and had perhaps done
so only a few weeks before, for the law prescribing a certain period
of residence is frequently violated, were brought up to a magis-
trate by the ward agent of the party which had captured them,
declared their allegiance to the United States, and were forthwith
placed on the roll.19
17 A. McKnqx.;Y, THE SUFFrAGE FRANcHIE IN Tun TmmT_ ENGLiSH
COLONES iN AmEMCA 133 (1905).
1
8 R. LANE, supra note 9, at 13.
19 2 J. BaxcE, Tm AmEnIcAN ComnmoNwEALTH 99 (1898).
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The Midwestern and Western states generally had residence re-
quirements which were very liberal. This was probably due to the
fact that these states were largely unsettled and were eager to at-
tract settlers to the land.
20
The residence requirements in the South were more like those
of the Eastern states and tended to be at least one or two years. It
has been stated that "[t]he lengthy residence requirement was ex-
pected to bear more heavily on Negroes because of their supposedly
peripatetic habits."21 The primary objectives which they sought to
achieve by enacting residence requirements were to give the new
voters an opportunity to acquire information necessary for an intel-
ligent vote, to become identified with the interests of the locality,
and also to prevent the colonization of voters.22 They were also ex-
pected to prevent strong political organizations from resorting to fraud
in their attempts to win elections. One writer has pointed out that
Matthew Quary, a notorious "boss" of Pennsylvania Republicans, is
reputed to have won the close election of 1888 for Benjamin Harri-
son by colonizing several thousand Philadelphia hoodlums in New
York long enough to swing that state into the Harrison column.
23
The prevention of colonization and fraud, the need to have the
new citizen acquire information before voting, to have him identify
with the interests of the community, and to identify the voters, were
all desired goals which were sought to be accomplished by the en-
actment of residence requirements.
III. RESIDENCY REQUIREMENTS-THEi CONSTITUTIONALITY
On June 15, 1968, Mr. and Mrs. Richard Hall moved from Cali-
fornia to the state of Colorado. Mr. Hall had recently graduated
from law school and was taking a permanent position with a Colorado
law firm. Shortly after their arrival in Colorado they purchased a
home, registered their car, enrolled their child in a nursery school,
and acquired Colorado drivers' licenses. On August 1, 1968, Mr. and
Mrs. Hall tried to register to vote in the upcoming Presidential elec-
tion, but were informed that they had not met the statutory residence
20K. PORTER, A HISTORY oF SUFFRAGE iN THE UNITED STATES (1918). It is
interesting to note that in 1860 seven states had residence requirements of only
six months and all of these states were in the Midwest or West.
21V. KEY, SOUTHERN POLriCS IN STATE AN NATION 537 (1949).
22People v. Graham, 267 IMI. 426, 108 N.E. 699 (1915); Estopinal v. Vogt,
111 La. 883, 46 So. 908 (1908); Howard v. Skinner, 87 Md. 556, 40 A. 379
(1898); Wright v. Blue Mountain Hosp. Dist., 214 Ore. 141, 328 P.2d 314 (1958).
23 Goldman, supra note 11 at 7.
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requirement and therefore would not be allowed to vote in the No-
vember Presidential election.
24
Article II of Section 1 of the United States Constitution provides,
'Each state shall appoint in such manner as the legislature thereof
may direct, a number of electors . ... "25 The courts have usually
interpreted this provision to grant to the states the power to determine
the qualifications of voters. This interpretation is based on the prop-
osition that the right of suffrage is not a privilege and immunity of
a citizen of the United States but is rather a right conferred by the
states.26 Since the right of suffrage is conferred by the states, the
courts have held,
The states have long been held to have broad powers to de-
termine the conditions under which the right of suffrage may be
exercised, absent of course the discrimination which the consti-
tution condemns.... So while the right of suffrage is established
and guaranteed by the Constitution it is subject to the imposition
of state standards which are not discriminatory and which do not
contravene any restriction that Congress acting pursuant to its
Constitutional powers has imposed.27
The court went on to say,
We do not suggest that any standards which a state desires to
adopt may be required of voters. But there is wide scope of
exercise of its jurisdiction. Residence requirements, age, previous
criminal records, are obvious examples indicating factors which a
state may take into consideration in determining the qualifications
of voters.
28
Therefore, assuming that the states have the right to impose re-
quirements on the right to vote, such restrictions must not be for-
bidden by other constitutional provisions.
The states have contended that they have absolute power to put
any burden they please on the selection of electors because of Article
H, Section 1.29 The Supreme Court has recently however disapproved
of this contention:
24 The Supreme Court recently decided that the case presented was moot
because the election had already taken place and Colorado had since reduced
its residency period to two months. Justice Marshall and Justice Brennan dis-
sented asserted that the case was not moot because the residency requirements
will continue to disenfranchise future residents, who will find it all but impos-
sible to reach the Supreme Court with a test case before election day. 90 S.Ct 200
(1969).
25 U.S. Const. art II, § 9.2 6 Pope v. Williams, 193 U.S. 621 (1904).2 7 Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 50 (1958).
28 id. at 50-51.
29 Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968).
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... [t]he Constitution is filled with provisions that grant Congress
or the States specific power to legislate in certain areas; these
granted powers are always subject to the limitation that they
may not be exercised in a way that violated other specific provi-
sions of the Constitution.
3 0
The Court went on to say specifically that "Ve therefore hold that
no State can pass a law regulating elections that violated the Four-
teenth Amendment's command that 'No state shall . . . deny to any
person . . . the equal protection of the laws."' 31
In Katzenback v. Morgan, the Court had held:
*.. [the States have no power to grant or withhold the franchise
on conditions that are forbidden by the Fourteenth Amendment,
or any other provision of the Constitution. Such exercises of state
power are no more immune to the limitations of the Fourteenth
Amendment than any other state action. 32
These decisions seem to indicate clearly that while states have
the power to impose restrictions on the right to vote, such restrictions
must not violate other constitutional provisions. To determine the
validity of state residency requirements it is therefore necessary
to see if they violate any other rights guaranteed under other consti-
tutional provisions.
A. Tim RiGHr To TRvEL ARGUMENT
The Articles of Confederation provided that "the people of each
state shall have free ingress and regress to and from any other state."33
This right is not specifically set forth in the United States Consti-
tution, but at least one writer has suggested that the reason for not
making it an express right was that it was already an implied right.34
Despite the fact that the right to travel is not specifically mentioned
the courts have considered it to be a fundamental right protected by
the Constitution.35 Chief Justice Taney recognized this right in the
Passenger Cases when he states:
30 Id. at 29.
81 Id.
32384 U.S. 641, 647 (1966).
33 Articles of Confederation, art. IV.
34 Z. CHaFEE, Tin= HUmAN RicHrs ix m CoNsTrrrioN oF 1787, 185
(1956).
35 In Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546 (No. 3230) (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823),
Paul v. Virginia 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1868), and Ward v. Maryland, 79 U.S.
(12 Wall.) 418 (1870), the right to travel interstate was grounded on the
privileges and immunities clause of Art. IV. § 2. See also Slanahtor-HnLse Cees,
83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872) and Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908).
In Edwards v. California, 314 U,S. 160 (1941) and Twining v. New Jersey,
(Continued on next page)
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For all the great purposes for which the Federal government
was formed, we are one people, with one common country. We
are all citizens of the United States; and, as members of the same
community, must have the right to pass and repass through every
part of it without interruption, as freely as in our own states.3 6
Later in United States v. Guest, the Court held, "[tihe right to
travel from one state to another... occupies a position fundamental
to the concept of our Federal Union. It is a right that has been firmly
established and repeatedly recognized."37
If the freedom to travel is clearly a right protected by the Con-
stitution, then any regulation or penalization because of the exercise
of that right will then be unconstitutional unless the state can show
some compelling state interest served by such regulation. The test
for the determination of the constitutionality of residency require-
ments was clearly stated by the court in Shapiro v. Thompson where
the Court said, ". . . any classification which serves to penalize the
exercise of that right, unless shown to be necessary to promote a com-
pelling governmental interest, is unconstitutional.' 38
The Court also noted that,
traditional criteria do not apply in these cases. Since the classi-
fication here touches on the fundamental right of interstate move-
ment its constitutionality must be judged by the stricter standard
of whether it promotes a compelling state interest.39
Therefore, to determine the constitutionality of state residence
requirements for voting in Presidential elections it is necessary to
examine the justifications and reasons given for the requirement in
order to determine if any compelling state interest is actually served.
The justifications which are usually advanced for required residence
for a designated term before being allowed to vote are (1) that the
voter should be resident in the community long enough to acquire
information necessary for an intelligent vote, (2) to become identified
with the interests of the locality, and (8) to prevent fraud and the
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
supra, reliance was placed on the privileges and immunities clause of the four-
teenth amendment. See also Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1868).
In Edwards v. California, supra, and the Passenger Cases 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283
(1849), a commerce clause approach was used. See also Kent v. Dulles, 357
U.S. 116 (1958), Apthecher v. Rusk, 378 U.S. 500 (1964), and Zemel v. Rusk,
U.S. 1 (1966), where the freedom of Americans to travel abroad was grounded
upon the due process clause of the fifth amendment.
36 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283 (1849).
37383 U.S. 745 (1966).
3889 S. Ct. 1322, 1331 (1969).
39 Id. at 1333.
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colonization of voters.40 An additional justification which may be ad-
vanced is that such requirements are necessary for the administrative
functions involved in registering voters.
While all of these may be considered areas of legitimate concern
and interest to the states, that alone will not meet the more exacting
test set forth by the Supreme Court. It is imperative therefore, that
each justification be analyzed to see whether it does serve a com-
pelling state interest. Before such an analysis is undertaken, how-
ever, it is important to point out that some restrictions may be much
more applicable to state and local elections while almost no such
applicability can be shown for national elections.
Since the Presidential elections involves national political figures
and national campaigning and advertising, the first justification would
seem inapplicable and any statute limiting the right to vote solely
on the basis of such an argument would seem to fall short of meeting
the compelling interest standard.
The second justification usually advanced would also seem to be
more applicable to elections on the state or local levels rather than
in a national Presidential election. The "interest of the locality"
argument is basically unsound because of the fact that in a Presi-
dential election the territory or locality is in reality the entire United
States and not some local political subdivision thereof. Both justi-
fications seem to fail because of the very nature of the Presidential
election and the campaign involved. As long as the campaigns con-
tinue to be carried on primarily by national television, magazines, and
newspapers, and as long as it involved national figures and national
and international issues, the mere factor of length of residence in a
particular state should in no way affect a person's ability to cast an
intelligent vote.
The third justification usually given by the states is that of the
prevention of fraudulent voting practices through either double
voting or the colonization of voters.41 This objective is admittedly
much more persuasive than the two previously mentioned. However,
even this justification seems to lack that necessary element of a com-
pelling governmental interest. The Supreme Court recently decided
a claim very much analogous to this problem. In a welfare residency
case,42 the Court was faced with the question of whether a one year
40 See People v. Graham, 267 IMI. 426, 108 N.E. 699 (1915); Estopinal v.
Vogt. 111, 883, 46 So. 908 (1908); Howard v. Skinner, 87 Md. 556, 40 A. 379
(1898); Wright v. Blue Mountain Hosp. Dist. 214 Ore. 141, 328 P.2d 314 (1958).
41 Hall v. Beals, 292 F. Supp. 610, 614 (D. Colo. 1968); Drueding v. Devlin,
234 F. Supp. 721 (D. Md. 1964), affd mem., 380 U.S. 125 (1965).
4 2 Shapiro v. Thompson, 89 S. Ct. 1322 (1969).
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residency period was justified in order to prevent fraud in the appli-
cation for, and receipt of, money grants for public assistance. The
Supreme Court held that the justification was insufficient because less
drastic means were available. The Court noted,
Since double payments can be prevented by a letter or a tele-
phone call, it is unreasonable to accomplish this objective by the
blunderbuss method of denying assistance to all indigent new-
comers for an entire year.
A similar argument could well be made with regard to residency
requirements for voting in a Presidential election. Recognizing that
the state has a valid interest in the prevention of fraud and double
voting it cannot accomplish this goal by standards which are un-
reasonable and essentially unnecessary. A broad declaration that
residency is required for this purpose must be analyzed to see if in
fact the same goal could be accomplished by much less drastic
means. Other factors, however, would tend to make the increased
possibility of fraud unlikely. Most states have statutes which punish
fraudulent voting practices,43 and the crime of perjury.44 Besides these
technical statutory provisions which serve to prevent fraud there is the
very practical fact that it would be highly unlikely that any political
organization would attempt or could succeed in swaying an election
which involved the entire nation. The influence on a Presidential elec-
tion through either double voting or the colonization of voters would
be minimal.
However, regardless of the likelihood of fraud, it is evident that
the states cannot achieve these goals by a method such as residency
requirement which serves as a blanket disenfranchisement of voters
without attempting to evaluate whether they are true residents.45
B. Tim EQUAL PoTEcrioN ARGumENT
The Supreme Court has long recognized that the states have power
to impose reasonable residency requirements as a condition for
voting.46 In fact, the Court has noted, ". . . the states have long been
held to have broad powers to determine the conditions under which
the right of suffrage may be exercised."47
The states have attempted, in the voting area, to create a classi-
fication between those who have resided in the state for one year, or
43 See e.g., Ky. R-ev. STAT. ch. 124 (1969).
44 Id.45 Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 96 (1965).4 6 Pope v. Williams, 193 U.S. 621 (1904).
47 Lassiter v. Northampton County Election Bd., 360 U.S. 45, 50 (1959).
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whatever the statutory requirement may be, and those who, although
they may be residents for other purposes, have not been a resident
for the required period. The Supreme Court has made it clear that
mere classification alone will not deprive a group of equal protection
nor will minor differences in the application of laws to different
groups. 48 The Court has frequently held, however, that invidious
distinctions do violate the Equal Protection Clause.49
Therefore, the Court will look beyond the mere classification to
determine whether the classification is reasonable in light of its pur-
pose. The Supreme Court has recently stated the approach it would
take in determining whether or not a state law violates the Equal
Protection Clause:
... we must consider the facts and circumstances of the law, the
interests which the State claims to be protecting, and interests
of those who are disadvantaged by the classification. 50
5o Williams v. Rhodes, 89 S. Ct. 5, 10 (1968).
The Court has also said that it will give the statute a close and
exacting examination, . .. "[s]ince the right to exercise the franchise
in a free and unimpaired manner is preservative of other basic civil
and political rights, any alleged infringement of the right of citizens to
vote must be carefully and meticulously scrutinized."51
In order to properly analyze the constitutionality of state residence
requirements it will therefore be necessary to determine the inter-
ests of the state and the interests of those who are disadvantaged
by the law. The justifications which have been given by the states for
the continuation of these laws were discussed under the right to
travel argument and will be only briefly mentioned now. Those justi-
fications are that such laws are necessary to identify the voter, to
prevent colonization and fraud, to insure that the new citizen ac-
quires information before voting, and to have him identify with the
interests of the community. The issue then becomes one of whether
or not those interests can justify the severe restrictions on voting
which the states have imposed. As previously mentioned, most of the
interests are irrelevant to national elections. The only interest which
would be equally important for all elections is that of prevention of
fraud, and, as shown earlier, that goal can be achieved by a simple
letter or phone call, which many states have recognized as sufficient.
48 Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1954).
49 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1966), Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536
(1965); Brown v. Bd. of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Skinner v. Oklahoma,
316 U.S. 535 (1942); and Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
51 Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 89 S. Ct. 1886 (1969); See Reynolds
v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
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The interests of those who are disadvantaged by the laws are
more readily seen. Their sole interest is in being able to exercise the
right to vote. Their interest is enhanced by the fact that it is a Presi-
dential election in which they seek to vote. No other election can
have as great an influence on the individual, on the country or on
the course of world events as that of the election of a President of
the United States. The interests of the citizenry in being allowed to
participate in that choice is one of fundamental importance in a
democratic society.
In view of this analysis, it is clear that the residency statutes
for voting in Presidential elections, even under the traditional equal
protection tests, creates a classification which is irrational and un-
reasonable. 52 But the denial of equal protection does not have to rest
on the traditional standard because the classification here infringes
on the fundamental right to vote. Its constitutionality must be judged
by the stricter standard of whether it promotes a compelling state
interest.53 Under this standard, the residence requirements imposed
by the states clearly violate the Equal Protection Clause.
IV. STATUTORY CnANcm-STATE LEvEL
When a nation begins to modify the elective qualification, it
may easily be foreseen that, sooner or later, that qualification will
be entirely abolished. There is no more invariable rule in the his-
tory of society; the further electoral rights are extended, the greater
is the need for extending them; for after each concession the
strength of the democracy increases, and its demands increase with
its strength ... concession follows concession, and no stop can be
made short of universal suffrage.54
During the last ten years there has been a trend among the states
to liberalize residence requirements. This trend has not involved all
the states, and the methods have at times been conflicting, but never-
theless, progress has been made. Essentially, there are two methods
by which this reform has been undertaken. The first method is that
of reducing the duration of the required residency. This approach has
been followed by at least two states. Louisiana has reduced its resi-
dence requirements from two years to one, and New Jersey has re-
duced its residence demand from one year to six months.55
52 de the traditional test, equal protection is denied only if the classi-
fication is "without any reasonable basis." Lindsley v. National Carbonic Gas
Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911).
53 Shapiro v. Thompson, 89 S. Ct. 1322, 1333 (1969).5
4 A. DE TOCQUEvLLE, supra note 1, at 57.
55 LA. CONsT. art. 8, § 1; N.J. CoNsr. art. 2, § 3.
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The second method, and the approach which seems to be the
most popular among the states, is to adopt special requirements for
voting in Presidential elections. Today, twenty-nine states have
adopted such a framework.56
The first really significant movement to provide special procedures
for allowing new residents to vote in Presidential elections was begun
in Connecticut in 1953, when that state adopted a statute which ex-
tended absentee voting to a person who left Connecticut to take up
residence in another state.57 This statute permitted such a person to
cast an absentee ballot in Connecticut for President and Vice Presi-
dent for a period of fifteen months, unless he has met the voting
residence requirement in the new state. In 1957, Vermont adopted
a similar statute which allows a fifteen month retention period. It also
requires that those who wish to vote, ". . . must file with their town
or city clerk a written declaration of intention to retain such Vermont
residence for the purpose of casting a vote for Presidential and Vice
Presidential electors."58
Another approach was taken by Wisconsin in 1954 when it adopted
a method which permits a new resident of Wisconsin having less
than one year of legal residence to vote for President and Vice Pres-
ident if he was a qualified voter in the state of prior residence, or if he
would have been eligible had he remained there until the election
date.59
Specifically the Wisconsin statute provides,
A person who has been a resident of this state for less than 1 year
prior to the date of a Presidential election shall be entitled to vote
for Presidential and Vice Presidential electors in such elections
but for no other officers, providing he was either a qualified elector
in another state immediately prior to his removal to this state or
would have been eligible to vote in such other state had he re-
mained there until such election, and provided further that he
would be a qualified elector under Section 601 except that he
has not resided in the state for 1 year.60
56 See Section I, Appendix.
57 
ONN. GEN. STAT. ch. 145, § 9-158 (1958).
5 8 VT. STAT. ANN. ch. 3, § 67 (1958).
59 Wis. STAT. ANw. ch. 9, § 9.045 (1955).
60 WIs. STAT. ch. 9, § 9.045 (1955). Now § 6.15 as amended (Supp. Vol. 2,
1969) reflects the change in the required length of residence which has changed
from one year to 6 months. The statute in full provides that:
"Any person who was or would have been a qualified elector on the day
of the Presidential election had he remained in the state from which he
moved and who is a qualified elector under H2 6.02 and 6.03, except
he has been a resident of this state for less than 6 months prior to the
date of the presidential election, is entitled to vote for the president and
vice president but for no other offices."
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The Wisconsin approach has been followed by at least three
states. In 1958 California amended its constitution to grant new resi-
dents the right to vote in Presidential elections. The amendment
essentially authorized the state legislature to extend the right to
otherwise qualified voters as long as they have resided in California
for at least 54 days.01 Missouri also amended its constitution to permit
new residents to vote for President and Vice President if they have
resided within the state at least sixty days.62 Ohio followed in 1957
by amending its constitution so as to authorize its legislature to extend
the right to vote to new residents of the state. In 1959 the legislature
acted on this authority and provided that otherwise qualified persons
could vote for President and Vice President if they met a forty day
residence requirement.6
Therefore, at present, at least two states, Connecticut and Ver-
mont have adopted the method of allowing former residents to cast
absentee ballots for President and Vice President, while at least four
states, Wisconsin, California, Missouri and Ohio, have adopted reforms
which allow new residents to vote without meeting lengthy resi-
dence requirements. Both of these approaches have therefore been
utilized in an effort to deal with the problems created by lengthy
residence requirements.
Recognizing the need for a uniform approach to the problem, in
1955 the Council of State Governments recommended the adoption of
a statute following the Connecticut plan.64 In 1962, the National Con-
ference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws promulgated the
Uniform Act for Voting by New Residents in Presidential Elections. 65
The Uniform Act generally follows the Wisconsin approach and waives
the requirement of residence so that new residents will be allowed to
vote, if otherwise qualified, so long as they apply for a ballot within
a specific number of days prior to the election. It has also provided
for a safeguard against fraud by making the application for a presi-
dential ballot appear in the form of an affidavit. The Uniform Act
also requires that a duplicate of the application be mailed to the ap-
plicant's state of last residence, which is to insure against the possi-
bility of double voting.66
61 CAL. ELEc. CODE § 751 (West 1961).
62 Mo. CoNsT. art. 8, § 2.
63 Omo Rv. CODE § 3504.01 (1960).
6 4 COUNCIL OF STATE GovRmmENTs, SuGGEsTED STATE LEGIsLAToN 77
(1955).6 5 HANDBOoK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COiMMSIssxONEIS ON UN-
roFm STATE LAws 261 (1962). For full text of the Uniform Act see Section
II, Appendix.66 See Section I, Appendix.
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The adoption of a uniform law would serve to eliminate the
disenfranchising effect of many state residence laws and would, at
the same time, provide for a uniform method of preventing fraud and
double voting.
V. PRoPosED FEDEiAL ACrEON
There have been numerous proposals before both the House and
Senate to provide relief for the millions of voters who are disen-
franchised by state residence requirements. As early as 1954, Repre-
sentative Curtis of Massachusetts introduced a proposal recommend-
ing to the states that they immediately enact legislation "to enable
a person to vote for Federal officials, when such persons would be
eligible to vote for such Federal officials, but for the resident require-
ments of the State in which he is residing."67 Although the proposal
was, with a few amendments, passed by the House, it failed in
the Senate.68
Representative Curtis reintroduced his proposal in the form of
House Concurrent Resolution 94 in the next session of Congress. This
time it met with success and was passed by the House on June 30,
195569 and by the Senate on January 16, 1956.70 In its final form the
resolution provided,
Whereas many citizens are deprived of the right to vote-because
they have recently moved from one state to another and have
not subsequent to such move complied with the residence require-
ments of the State to which they have moved; and
Whereas it is desirable that citizens should be entitled to vote
for the office of President and Vice-President whether or not they
have moved from one state to another; and
Whereas such disenfranchisement could be avoided by recip-
rocal arrangements between the several states which would recog-
nize the right of a citizen to vote in the state from which he had
moved for such reasonable period of time as would enable him
to fulfill the residence requirements in the state to which he had
moved: Therefore be it
Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concur-
ring), That the Congress express itself as favoring, and recom-
mends to the several states the consideration of appropriate legis-
lation to enable a person to vote for President and Vice-President
when such person would be eligible to vote but for the fact that
he had moved from one state to another and had not yet ful-
67 100 CONG. REc. 13468 (1954).
68Id. at 13817.
69 H.R. Con. Res. 94, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 101 CONG. REC. 12395 (1955).
70 102 CONG. REc. 533 (1956).
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filled the residence requirements of such state to which he had
moved.71
Another early activist at the federal level was Senator Kefauver
who introduced S. J. Res. 14, which called for voting by absentee
ballot in the state from which a voter moved for a period of two years,
provided he would not qualify to vote in another state during that
period.72 Senators Kefauver and Keating introduced S. J. Res. 128 on
August 28, 1961, which would have limited residence requirements
for voting in Presidential elections to a period not to exceed ninety
days.7
3
Recently there has been a renewed interest in federal legislation
in this area. Senator Goldwater has introduced a constitutional amend-
ment which would enable citizens to qualify for voting in a Presi-
dential election with only thirty days residence in any state.74
A different approach has been taken by Senator Edward Ken-
nedy with his introduction of a bill on May 14, 1969, which would
amend the Voting Bights Act of 1965 to permit those who change
their residence to vote in Presidential elections. 75 Kennedy's bill
differs from the Goldwater proposal in that it is in the form of a
legislative enactment rather than a constitutional amendment. Senator
Kennedy urged that the objective of full voting privileges should be
accomplished by statute rather than by amending the Constitution.76
The primary question arising under Senator Kennedy's proposal
would be the constitutionality of the Congress legislating in this area.
Under the terms of Article I, section 2, the people are guaranteed
the right to vote for Representatives and Senators. But the Consti-
tution also provides that "the electors in each state shall have the
qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous branch
of the State legislature." Therefore, the qualifications established by
the state are adopted by the Constitution as appropriate for federal
elections. This method has been explained in Ex Parte YarboroughJ7
where the court stated, ".... Congress may not legislate as to the quali-
fications of the voters since this power is given by the Constitution
71 H.R. Con. Res. 94, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., 101 CONG. REc. 12395 (1955).
72 S.J. Res. 14, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961); S.J. Res. 90, 87th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1961); 19 CoNG. Q. 1408 (1961).
73 S. J. Res. 128, 107 CONG. lRhc. 17139 (1961).
74 S.J. Res. 59, 91 Cong., 1st Sess., 115 CONG. PEc. 4541 (daily ed. May 5,
1969).
75 S. 2165, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 115 CONG. E~c. 5176 (daily ed. May 14,
1969).
76 115 CONG. REc. 5177 (daily ed. May 14, 1969).
77 110 U.S. 651 (1884).
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to the States."78 The qualifications would therefore appear to be the
responsibility of the states and reserved to them by the Constitution.
The recent decision by the Supreme Court in Katzenback v. Mor-
gan,79 would, however seem to give strong support for the proposi-
tion that Congress possesses the power to enact legislation in this
area. In Katzenback, the court upheld the validity of section 4(e) of
the Voting Rights Act of 1965, which provided that no person who
had a sixth grade education and who met certain other requirements
could be denied the right to vote in any federal, state or local election
because of his failure to pass a literary test in English. This decision
would seem to give Congress great power to legislate in the area of
state voter qualifications. The Court, in essence, held that Congress
had broad powers in this area even though the effect of the statute
was to override certain provisions of state law.
The fact that Congress enacts a statute rather than seeking a
constitutional amendment would seem, therefore, to make no dif-
ference as far as its constitutionality is concerned.
VI. SummARY AND REcomMNDATIoNs
The current state residency requirements which disenfranchise
millions of citizens every year need to be changed. The reasons and
the goals originally put forward by the states are no longer sufficient
or necessary justifications for denying new residents the right to vote
in Presidential elections. The changes needed can be achieved in
one of three ways. First, the Supreme Court may declare such statutes
to be unconstitutional by holding that they violate the right to free
travel and the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution. Such a
decision would not be unexpected in the light of the recent decision
declaring the one year residency requirement for welfare unconsti-
tutional. Secondly, the states may continue the movement towards
greater liberalization of residency requirements.
Finally, the Congress may adopt national legislation along the lines
proposed by Senator Kennedy. The author feels that this method is
preferable to the others for several reasons. It is to be favored over
the first possible solution because the Supreme Court may never reach
the constitutional issue in a case coming before it. A decision may
not be reached because the case will be considered moot or the court
may dispose of the case by means other than on the constitutional
issues.
78 Id. at 651.
79384 U.S. 641 (1966).
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Federal legislation is preferable over continued state action be-
cause the states are developing different approaches which still leave
some voters disenfranchised, and some states may never enact such
legislation on their own, or if they do, it may be insufficient.
A uniform national policy would serve to insure that all citizens
have the right to vote for President and Vice President of the United
States. The time for a change has been long overdue and the Con-
gress must act soon to prevent the continued and increasing disen-
franchisement caused by our mobile society.
APPENDIX
I. MINIMUM LENGTH OF RESIDENCE REQUIREMENTS
FOR 1968 GENERAL ELECTION By STATE
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I State permits former residents to vote for
qualified in new state of residence.
2 If less may vote in old precinct.
President and Vice President where not
3 If less may vote in old precinct if in same municipality.
Source: U.S. Senate, Office of the Secretary, Nomination and Election of the President
and Vice President of the United States, U.S. Government Printing Office, January, 1968. Cor-




I. UNwom Aca FoR VOTING
By NEW REsmENTs IN PREsmmqnrAL ELECTIONS
SECTION 1. [Eligibility of New Residents to Vote.] Each citizen
of the United States who, immediately prior to his removal to this
state, was a citizen of another state and who has been a resident of
this state for less than [insert period of required residence for voting]
prior to a presidential election is entitled to vote for presidential and
vice-presidential electors at that election, but for no other offices, if
(1) he otherwise possesses the substantive qualifications to vote
in this state, except the requirement of residence (and registration),
and
(2) he complies with the provisions of this Act.
Comment
Derived in part from Sec. 9.045, Ch. 9, Wisc. Stat. (1959), See.
3504.01, Ohio Rev. Code (Baldwin, 1960), and Calif. Election Code
Ann. (1961), Ch. 4, § 751, and Sec. 111.063, Mo. Rev. Stat. (1960).
As in the Missouri Statute but unlike the other statutes no reference
is made to qualifications for voting in the former state of residence.
SECTION 2. [Application for Presidential Ballot by New Resi-
dents]. A person desiring to qualify under this Act in order to vote
for presidential and vice presidential electors [is not required to reg-
ister but] on or before [insert last date for registration or some other
date sufficiently in advance of the election] shall make an application
in the form of an affidavit executed in duplicate in the presence of
[appropriate official] substantially as follows:
State of ..........................................................................
ss.
C ounty of ......................................................................
I .......................................................................... , do solemnly swear that:
1. I am a citizen of the United States.
2. Before becoming a resident of this state, I resided at ................
........................................................ street, in [town] [township] [village]
[city] of ..................................................... ........................................ [county]
of the state of .............................................................
3. On the day of the next presidential election, I shall be at least
[21] years of age. I have been a resident of this state since ....................
................ 19 .......... , now residing at ............................................................
................................ Street, in the [precinct] of the [ward] of the [town]
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[township] [village] [city] of .......................................................................
.................................................................... [county].
4. I have resided in [enacting state] less than [ ................................
........................................ ]. I believe I am entitled under the laws of this
state to vote at the presidential election to be held November ............
................................. 19 .....................
5. I hereby make application for a presidential and vice presi-
dential ballot. I have not voted and will not vote otherwise than
by this ballot at that election.
Signed ........................................................................................
(Applicant)
Subscribed and sworn to before me this ............................ day of ........
................ .............................. 9 
Signed ..........................................................................................
(Title and name of cfficer authorized to administer oaths)
Comment
Derived in part from Sec. 111.065, Mo. Rev. Stat. (1960), and
Sec. 9.046, Wisc. Stat. (1959), but unlike the Wisconsin statute no
certificate is required to be sent to former state of residence for
verification of applicant's qualification in that state. It will be noted
that the time for filing the application is bracketed so that the period
specified will fit in with the election laws of each state. Likewise the
clause negativing requirement for registration is bracketed as it will
not be needed where registration is not required.
SECTION 3. [Mailing Duplicate Application]. The [appropriate
official] shall immediately mail to the appropriate official of the state
in which the applicant last resided the duplicate of the application.
Comment
This provision is inserted as a safeguard against voting by the
applicant in the former state of residence.
SECTION 4. [Filing and Indexing Information from Other States].
The [appropriate official] shall file each duplicate application or other
official information received by him from another state indicating
that a former resident of this state has made application to vote at a
presidential election in another state and shall maintain an alpha-




This provision is new. If the Uniform Act is widely adopted it
will be valuable as a safeguard against voting by a former resident
of one state who might endeavor to vote as a new resident of an-
other state.
SECTION 5. [Delivery of Ballot to Applicant]. If satisfied that the
application is proper and that the applicant is qualified to vote under
this Act the [appropriate official] shall deliver to the applicant a
ballot for presidential and vice presidential electors not sooner than
[ ................................ ] days nor later than [ ................................ ] days prior
to the next presidential election.
Comment
Derived from See. 9.046, Wisc. Stat. (1959), except that the time
fixed for delivery of the ballot is bracketed.
SECTION 6. [Voting by New Residents].
(a) The applicant, upon receiving the ballot for presidential
and vice presidential electors shall mark forthwith the ballot in the
presence of the [appropriate official] but in a manner that the official
cannot know how the ballot is marked. He shall then fold the ballot
in the [appropriate official] presence so as to conceal the markings,
and deposit and seal it in an envelope furnished by the [appropriate
official].
(b) The voter shall enclose the envelope containing the ballot in a
carrier envelope which shall be securely sealed. There shall be im-
printed on the outside of the carrier envelope a statement substantially
as follows:
Certification of New Resident Voter
I have qualified as a new resident voter in this state to vote for
presidential and vice presidential electors. I have not applied nor
do I intend to apply for an absentee voter's ballot from the state from
which I have removed. I have not voted and I will not vote otherwise
than by this ballot.




The voter shall sign the certification upon the carrier envelope
\ as set forth above, and shall then deliver the sealed carrier envelope
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to the [appropriate official], who shall keep the carrier envelope in
his office until delivered by him to the [appropriate election official].
Comment
Derived in part from Sec. 9.046, Wisc. Stat. (1959) and Sec.
111.065, Mo. Rev. Stat. (1960).
SECTION 7. [List of Applicants Open for Public Inspection]. The
[appropriate official] shall keep open to public inspection a list of all
persons who have applied under this Act to vote as new residents
with their names, addresses and application dates.
Comment
Provision for public inspection of the names of new resident
voters is contained in Sec. 9.046, Wisc. Stat. (1959); Calif. Election
Laws Ann. (1961), C. 4. § 761; Sec. 8504.06, Ohio Rev. Code (Bald-
win, 1960); Sec. 111.065, Mo. Rev. Stat. (1960).
SECTION 8. [Delivery and Deposit of Ballots].
(a) [Appropriate Officials] shall prepare and deliver the ballots for
new residents to the [appropriate election officials] in the manner pre-
scribed by law for absentee ballots. The ballots shall be processed in
accordance therewith.
(b) The [appropriate election officials] shall record the new resi-
dent voter's name with a notation designating him as a new resident
voting for presidential and vice presidential electors only.
Comment
These provisions are substantially the same as subsection (4),
Sec. 9.046, Wisc. Stat. (1959) and are similar to the procedure specified
in other states.
SECTION 9. [Challenge of New Resident's Vote]. The vote of any
new resident may be challenged for cause. The [appropriate election
officials] have all the powers and authority conferred upon them
by law in respect to hearing and determining the legality of chal-
lenged votes.
Comment
All of the statutes considered have provisions for challenging votes
and the above provision is substantially the same as subsection (5),
See. 9.046, Wise. Stat. (1959).
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SECTION 10. [Penalties]. Any person wilfully making a false
statement or affidavit under this Act shall be fined not less than
[$ ........................ ] nor more than [$ ...................... ] or punished by im-
prisonment for a period of not less than [ ................................ ] nor more
than [ ................................ ] or both. Any public official who wilfully
refuses or neglects to perform any of the duties prescribed by this
Act or violates any of its provisions shall be fined not less than
[$ ............................ ] nor more than [$ ............................ ] or punished by
imprisonment for a period not less than [ ................................ ] nor more
than [ ................................ ] or both.
Comment
All of the statutes considered provide for penalties, some in-
corporating by reference provisions of other statutes. This section is
patterned on the Missouri statute which sets forth the penalties
without reference to other legislation (Sec. 111.067, Mo. Rev. Stat.
(1960), but is bracketed in case provisions of other statutes are
adequate.
SECTION 11. [Application of Other Statutes]. Except as provided
in this Act, the provisions of law relating to absentee ballots apply
also to the casting and counting of ballots and challenging of votes
by new residents, the furnishing of election supplies, ballots, canvassing
of ballots, and making proper returns of the results of the election.
Comment
This provision is new and is desgned to deal with problems not
expressly covered in the Act.
SECTION 12. [Definition of State]. As used in this Act "State" in-
cludes the District of Columbia.
Comment
The definition of "state" was extended to include the District of
Columbia because of the adoption of the 23rd Amendment in 1961
allowing residents of the District of Columbia to vote in presidential
elections.
SECTION 13. [Uniformity of Interpretation]. This Act shall be
so construed as to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform
the law of those states which enact it.
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SECTION 14. [Severability]. If any provision of this Act or the
application thereof to any person or circumstances is held invalid,
the invalidity does not affect other provisions or applications of the
Act which can be given effect without the invalid provision or appli-
cation, and to this end the provisions of this act are severable.
SECTION 15. [Short Title]. This Act may be cited as the Uni-
form Act for Voting by New Residents in Presidential Elections.





SECTION 17. [Time of Taking Effect]. This act shall take effect
